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Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 6)As INDICATED IN THE PREFACE, this essay is a condensed ver-
sion of parts of a larger study. It attempts merely to outline
my views on the matters dealt with, leaving the full argument
and most of the supporting evidence to be presented later.
I should like to begin with a fairly commonplace idea: from
the standpoint of business-cycle theory, investment is not an
autonomous variable determined by factors independent of
cycles. It is rather a controlling factor which is itself governed
by forces inherent in businesscycles. Many considerations
support this view, but one of the most significant isthat
inventories are an important object of short-term investment.
And whatever we may think about other objects of investment,
inventories and inventory investment arecloselyrelated to
current levels of consumption and production and to rates of
change in. them. Hence an adequate explanation of business
cycles should include an explanation of how inventories behave.
To grasp how important a factor inventories are in the
generation and development of business cycles, we need only
examine Simon K'uznets' estimates of gross national product.
These demonstrate that a very large share of the cyclical
changes in gross national product has regularly taken the form
of changes in the volume of inventory investment.' For ex-
ample,during the five business cycles identified by the National
Bureau between the two World Wars, the average increase
in gross national product between the trough and peak years
1By'inventory investment' or 'volume of inventory investment',1 meanthe
net value of the physical additions to stocks in a given period, over and above
any goods sold or otherwise used up. 'Inventory disinvestment', as I use the
term, refers to the net value of the physical change in inventories when this
change is negative. Both terms are equivalent to the first differences in inven-
tories, that is, to the rate of change in inventories per unit of time (of course,
after the effect of price changes upon the book value of stocks has been
allowed for). A 'change in the volume of inventory investment' implies a
comparison between inventory investment in one period and inventory invest-
ment in another, that is, a comparison between the rates of change in inven-
tories in two periods.
A simple example will illustrate the meaning of these terms. Let the value
of inventories, measured in constant prices, be $1,000 at the end of Year 1,
$1,200 at the end of Year 2, $1,500 at the end of Year 3 and $1,300 at the
end of Year 4. The inventory investment (or the volume of inventory invest-
ment) is $200 during Year 2 and $300 during Year 3. During Year 4 there
is inventory disinvestment of $200. The changeininventory investmentis
+$ioo between Years 2 and 3 and —$500 between Years 3 and 4.
1of business expansions was some $12billionin 1929prices.
The average increase in inventory investment from trough to
peak years was nearly $3 billion—about 23percentof the
average expansion in gross national product. The average share
of such a variable process as the fabrication of producer durable
equipment, on the contrary, was only 14percent,that of con-
struction only 6 percent, and that of the output of consumer
durable goods, 13 percent. During contractions, the average
share of inventory investment change in the average change in
gross national product was even more impressive—47 percent.
The other major elements of investment all cut smaller figures:
producer durable equipment, 26 percent; construction, 11 per-
cent; consumer durable goods, 19 percent.2
Since this paper is concerned mainly with manufacturers'
inventories, it is pertinent to notice the part played by this
category of stocks. According to Kuznets' figures, fluctuations
of inventory investment by manufacturers accounted for about
half the total cyclical change in aggregate inventory investment
in both expansions and contractions. In other words, they
were of about the same importance as changes in the volume
of construction or in the output of durable producer or con-
sumer goods taken separately.3
2 These figuresare based on gross national product estimatesin National
Product since 1869 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946). Kuznets'
inventory investment componentis derived from inventory estimates based
largely, although not exclusively, on end-of-year book value figures reported
by corporations to the Bureau of Internal Revenue or on other estimates of
book values at the ends of calendar years. To get estimates in constant prices,
the book value figures were corrected for price changes, allowance being made
for the age of inventories in each industry group and for end-of-year mark-
downs. For manufacturing industries, I made revised estimates to allow for
the diverse elements of cost applying to purchased materials, goods in process,
and finishedgoods,respectively.Inventory investment inany yearisthe
difference between the value of inventory at the end of the given year and
that at the end of the preceding year after both values have been corrected
for price changes. The methods by which inventory estimates and corrections
for price changes were made are explained fully in my forthcoming book.
Similar calculations were made by Simon Kuznets in Commodity Flow and
Capital Formation in the Recent Recovery and Decline, 1932.1938 (National
Bureau of Economic Research, Bulletin 74, June 25, 1939). The importance
thesefiguresattributetoinventory fluctuationsisprobably limitedtothe
relatively short business cycles identified in the National Bureau chronology.
For example, the increase in inventory investment plays a much smaller role
in the long upswing from 1921 to 1929 than in the three short expansions
2From the viewpoint of proximate causation, these surprising
results may confidently be laid to two facts. The first is simply
that the technique and organization of production and dis-
tribution in this country cause the quantity of stocks carried
to be large relative to the gross national product of a year.
Between 1919and1938 the average value of commercial
inventories was about 35 percent of gross national product per
annum.4 This means that if the physical quantity of stocks
grew 6 percent in the course of a year from an assumed posi-
tion of stability—which one might fairly take to be a moderate
change-—this would of itself involve an increase in gross
product of approximately 2 percent. A 10 percent change in
gross product, on the contrary, would be deemed large, in any
peacetime year. Thus, a moderate change in stocks can easily
constitute a considerable fraction of a large annual change in
gross national product.
The second fact is that during short business cycles of the
so-called tforty-month' variety, investment in stocks, measured
in constant prices, tends to be at o.r near its cyclical maximum
when output, that is, gross national product, reaches a peak.
Similarly, disinvestment in stocks tends to be close toits
cyclical maximum when output reaches a trough. These tenden-
and two short contractions into which the National Bureau divides this period.
The same point has been noticed by Alvin H. Hansen in his FiscalPolicy and
BusinessCycles (NortQn, 1941), Chapter II.
The differential importance of inventory investment in long and short cycles
cannot be clearly established on the basis of our experience in the five business
cycles between 1919 and 1938, for which annual estimates of gross national
product and its components are now available. As indicated, however, illustra-
tions suggesting such a difference can be found, and there are good a priori
reasonsfor thinking that a difference would normally exist. Both the statistical
indications and the theoretical considerations are set forth in detail in my
forthcoming monograph.
The importance attributed to inventory investment by these figures is further
limited by the fact that they do not (and, of course, cannot)distinguish
between planned and unplanned investment. It is clear, however, that a change in
output can be said to have been caused by a change in the volume of inventory
investment only to the extent that the change in inventory investment was
planned by the business enterprises holding the stocks. Otherwise, the change
in inventory investment might simply reflect an unexpected change in demand
while the change in output was due to other causes. For some further remarks
on this subject, see Section III.
4 'Commercial inventories' here refer to all stocks held by American business,
including those held on farms. It excludes stocks held by consumers, govern-
ments, and philanthropic institutions.
3cies are clearly revealed by comparisons of inventory investment
—not only in the aggregate but also by manufacturers and
dealers—with the National Bureau chronology of business-
cycle turns or with the cyclical peaks and troughs of, say, the
Federal Reserve Board Index of Industrial Production. Conse-
quently, the contribution of inventory investment to output is
positive and close to a maximum for the cycle in peak years,
and its. contribution to output is negative and close to a mini-
_mum in trough years. Other things being equal, therefore, the
timing of the turns of inventory investment cycles during busi-
ness cycles operates to maximize the contribution of changes in
the rate of inventory investment to changes in output between
trough and peak years of business, and between peaks and
troughs.
Th'e timing of inventory investment cycles is crucial for an
understanding of business cycles. On it depends not merely
the magnitude of the influence wielded by stocks in accentuating
expansions and contractions, but also the answer to the moot
question whether inventoriesare regularly instrumental in
bringing these movements to an end and in setting a reverse
movement going. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the only
comprehensive estimates of stocks for a considerable period
are annual. For from the annual data,, one cannot determine
with any assurance whether the peaks and troughs of inventory
investment have tended to come in the very same months as
the cyclical turns of business or not. As far as they go, how-
ever, the annual estimates indicate that inventory investment
tends neither to lead no.r to lag behind output and business
at large. And our experience is that when annual data behave
like this, the average lead or lag, if any, that might be revealed
by monthly data covering several cycles is small—rarely longer
than three months.
This observation, crude asitis,is of great theoretical
interest. For it is commonly believed that businessmen tend
to keep stocks in approximately constant proportion to output
or sales. This notion, often encountered in applications of the
acceleration principle to inventory investment, implies that
inventories—not inventory investment—will move synchron-
4ously with output andsales,and that inventory investment and
rates of change in output and sales reach cyclical maxima and
minima at about the same time. Indicators of output, in manu-
facturing in any event, show, however, that while the peak
rate of change in output sometimes occurs near turns in
business, it more often comes much earlier. This induces an
expectation, on the theory here in question, that inventory
investment will frequently turn considerably before business
does; but this, as I have just said, is at variance with experience.
The same general difficulty emerges from an inspection of
the volume of stocks (in contrast to their rate of change) over
the course of business cycles. The peak and trough levels of
inventories held by both business at large and manufacturers
alone have regularly lagged behind the peaks and troughs of
business, rather than moved in roughly synchronous fashion,
as the more common theory implies. And though annual data
are poor guides to timing, I think these data, supplemented
by such broad monthly series as are available, justify the
conclusion that the lag of the physical volume of stocks behind
output is not less than six months. Thus the common theory
about the relation between inventories and output is obviously
in need of serious revision.
Although confusion in the literature is rampant, similar
observations about the timing of inventories are not lacking.
Lloyd Metzler's recent papers on inventory cycles, for example,
provide illustrations of economic models based on the assump-
tion that the cyclical turns of inventories occur later than those
of business at large.5 His models also leave room for the fact,
though they do not require, that the peaks and troughs of
inventory investment occur near the peaks and troughs of
business, rather than considerably earlier. Both observations
are, as I have stated, in general accord with the evidence.
And I suggest that the two chief problems in this area of
inventory research are:(1)todetermine whether inventory
Nature and Stability of Inventory Cycles, Review of &onomic Statistics,
Aug. 1941, pp. 113-29; Business Cycles and the Modern Theory of Employ-
ment, American Economic Review, June 1946, pp. 278-91; andFactorsGovern-
ing the Length of Inventory Cycles, Review of Economic Statistics, Feb. 1947,
pp. 1-15.
5investment, which I have described loosely as turning 'near'
the peaks and troughs of business, may not actually lead by a
short interval and thus constitute one of the forces that together
turn the business tide; (2)toexplain the lag in the volume
of inventories behind output and the lag in inventory invest-
ment behind the rate of change in output. A valid explanation,
when attained, will be of great valt.ie. It will help provide a
basis for more satisfactory predictive models, and itwill
furnish insight into conundrums such as the division of inven-
tory changes into 'intended' and 'unintended' elements, without
which an adequate statement concerning the role of stocks in
business cycles is impossible. This paper is offered as a con-
tribution to the second of these problems.
It is my conviction that progress toward an understanding
of the cyclical behavior of stocks has been blocked chiefly by
the fact that inventories have generally been treated as a
homogeneous mass within which differences in behavior are
not significant and toall parts of which much the same
explanation is appropriate. True, one sometimes finds gross
and inadequate distinctions, such as between finished and
unfinished goods, or categories with nonoperational definitions
such as Keynes' "working èapital" and "liquid capital". By
contrast, I believe that a sound explanation of the behavior
of stocks can be reached only when fairly numerous categories
are distinguished, and I propose to support this view by
analyzing the large block of stocks—about 40percentof the
total—that is held by manufacturers.
II
The various classes of stocks held by manufacturers differ
from one another with respect both to the motives that control
inventory policy and to the ability of manufacturers to imple-
ment their policies promptly and completely. As a result the
cyclical behavior of these classes of stocks differs materially,
and the behavior of manufacturers' stocks in the aggregate is
to be. understood as simply the composite of the disparate
fluctuations of the various parts.
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